Technical Investigation Report - CDC

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Technical Investigation ReportRelease of GB at the Tooele ChemicalAgent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) onMay 8-9, 2000Prepared by:Department of Health and Human ServicesCenters for Disease Control and PreventionJune 2000National Center for Environmental Health4770 Buford Highway, N.E.Atlanta, Georgia 30341CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION BRANCH

Table of ContentsList of Acronyms.3Executive Summary .4Introduction .6Objectives of the CDC Investigation .6Summary of Events.7Agent Air Monitoring Systems (TOCDF) .8Perimeter Network Air Monitoring System.12Evaluation of Potential Impact on Public Health .13Medical Clinic .14Emergency Operations Center (EOC) notification .15Contingency Procedures .15Conclusions .16Recommendations .17Figure 1 .19Figure 2 .20Attachment A .21Attachment B .27Attachment C .302

List of FTWAUSCHPPMVXAutomatic Continuous Air Monitoring System AfterburnerAllowable Stack ConcentrationChemical Agent Munitions Disposal SystemCenters for Disease Control and PreventionCholinesteraseControl Room OperatorDepot Area Air Monitoring SystemDeactivation Furnace SystemDemilitarization Protective EnsembleExplosive Containment RoomExplosive Containment VestibuleEmergency Operations CenterEnvironmental Protection AgencyFlame Photometric DetectorSarin; isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridateGas Chromatograph or Gas ChromatographyGeneral Population LimitLimit of QuantificationMinimum Detection LimitMaximum Ground Level ConcentrationMass Spectrometry or Mass SpectralPollution Abatement SystemProcess Data Acquisition and Recording SystemQuality LaboratoryQuality PlantRetention TimeSupervisor Control Room OperatorTooele Chemical Agent Disposal FacilityTime-Weighted Average [concentration]U.S. Army Center Center for Health Promotion and Preventive MedicineO-ethyl-S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl) methyl phosphonothiolate3

Release of GB at theTooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Tooele, UtahExecutive SummaryThe Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is directed by Congress to providepublic health oversight of Department of Defense’s chemical weapons disposal facilities. Thisresponsibility has been delegated to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),which is an agency within the DHHS. In response to the release of GB (sarin) at the TooeleChemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF), CDC dispatched a team to conduct an independentevaluation of this release. This investigation focused on the air monitoring systems and thepotential public health impact of the release.From 11:26 pm on May 8, 2000 to 12:56 am on May 9, 2000, GB was released from thecommon stack during a bi-phasic incident at TOCDF. The peak concentration wasapproximately 3.6 times the allowable stack concentration. No munitions or bulk agent werebeing processed at the time of the release. The source of agent in this incident included a liquidGB agent strainer sock placed on the deactivation furnace system gate. The release occurredduring a maintenance procedure conducted under abnormal incinerator conditions. This eventdoes not reflect the efficiency of the deactivation furnace system with its associated pollutionabatement system under normal operating conditions.The Automatic Continuous Air Monitoring System (ACAMS) for the common stackfunctioned as designed, alerting personnel of the release. However, control room personnelincorrectly assumed that no agent source existed in the deactivation furnace system. Thisincorrect assumption resulted in continuation of their attempts to purge and re-light the after burners even after the second stack ACAMS went into alarm. Because the two involvedACAMS have different types of chromatographic columns, the simultaneous alarms wereessentially a confirmation of presence of GB. Control room personnel discounted ormisunderstood this information. The contingency procedure implemented during the eventincorrectly utilized the protocol that assumed presence of agent was not probable.Review of the biweekly TOCDF ACAMS quality control report indicated that all ACAMSstations at TOCDF were operating well within established quality control limits. However, thedeactivation furnace system duct ACAMS provided inconsistent data compared with thatobserved at the common stack. This inconsistency is believed to have resulted fromcontamination in the duct sample probe.The perimeter Depot Area Air Monitoring System (DAAMS) stations were operational at thetime of the incident. The GB results of the DAAMS tubes were all below the administrativelyestablished reporting limit of 20% of the general population limit. However, perimeter station905 showed a small, but discernable, chromatographic response at the retention time for GB.Careful evaluation of the meteorological data at the time the incident does not support arelationship between the release at the common stack and the response observed at station 905.However, analytical data from the DAAMS analysis cannot confirm or deny the presence of GBin this sample.4

The Emergency Operation Center was informed and reportedly conducted dispersion modelingof the incident. However, the Emergency Operation Center delayed informing Tooele County ofthe release for approximately 4 hours.CDC used information gathered from the investigation and the SCREEN3 EnvironmentalProtection Agency’s (EPA)-approved dispersion model to evaluate potential human healthconsequences of this release. Worst-case assumptions were used in the model to predict themaximum possible public health impact of the release. The maximum peak releaseconcentration was assumed constant for the entire 30-minute release, although monitoring dataindicated that this peak concentration existed for 6 minutes or less. Even with this mostconservative approach, the calculated potential exposures for workers and the general populationwere less than 1% of the established occupational exposure limit or the general population limitfor GB, respectively. Based on this modeling data and current toxicologic data on GB, no shortterm or long-term adverse health effects are expected for TOCDF workers or the surroundingpopulation.This report presents fifteen recommendations to help reduce the probability of similar events,improve the performance and utility of the monitoring system, and improve overall event-relatedcommunications (see the Recommendations section of this report).5

IntroductionThe Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is directed by Congress to providepublic health oversight of Department of Defense’s chemical weapons disposal facilities. Thisresponsibility has been delegated to CDC, which is an agency within the DHHS. In thiscapacity, CDC was notified on May 9, 2000 about the release of the chemical agent GB on May8, 2000 at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF). CDC dispatched a team tobegin an independent investigation of the incident. The CDC investigation focused on the airmonitoring systems and the potential public health impact of the release.Objectives of the CDC InvestigationOperational events. The CDC representatives observed the collection of engineering and otherdata for the development of a chronology of plant and personnel operational events before,during, and after the release of chemical agent. CDC participated in discussions withengineering staff to develop a basic functional understanding of these chronological events todetermine the impact on plant operations, and how these events resulted in the release ofchemical agent outside engineering controls.Air monitoring. The CDC representatives reviewed the operational status of both in-plant andperimeter air monitoring systems before, during, and after the release. The monitoring data,quality control data, and appropriateness of responses and activities of monitoring personnelwere evaluated. The overall accuracy and validity of the monitoring data were carefullydetermined. The documentation, interpretation, and utilization of the monitoring results wereexamined.Compatibility of monitoring results and operational activities. CDC representatives compared theair monitoring data and operational events to evaluate the chronological, spatial, and operationalcompatibility and consistency of these data.Evaluation of potential impact on public health. CDC representatives utilized the air monitoringdata, the operational data, and meteorologic data in conjunction with an EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA)-approved dispersion model to define the agent plume to evaluate thepotential exposure to workers and the general public. Worst-case scenarios were developed toyield a most conservative result.Documentation, interpretation, and reporting. Once all data were consolidated, CDC evaluatedthe data and presented their findings in this independently generated report. This report willinclude recommendations to help reduce probability of reoccurrence of similar incidents,improve the performance and utility of the monitoring system, and improve overall event-relatedcommunications.6

Summary of EventsOn May 8, 2000, the day shift at the TOCDF was processing M56 rockets in the deactivationfurnace system (DFS).1 At approximately 4:00 pm (1600 hours) the DFS lower tipping gatefailed to close properly, and munitions/agent processing was terminated. At 8:10 pm (2010hours), staff began a demilitarization protective ensemble (DPE) entry to repair the DFS lowertipping gate and to water wash the DFS feed chute. After several problems during the entry, theDPE entrants completed cleaning the tripping gate and the wash-down of the feed chute atapproximately 9:30 pm (2130 hours). Before leaving the explosive containment room (ECR),the DPE entrants cleaned the liquid agent strainer and placed the used strainer sock with its GBagent-saturated debris on top of the DFS sliding gate. Approximately one pound of strainerwaste was placed on the DFS sliding gate. This waste is currently believed to be the majorsource of agent involved in the release, although the ECR was highly contaminated with GBfrom processing earlier during the day, and vapors were drawn from the ECR into the DFSduring the incident contributed as a source of agent. During this maintenance operation,temperatures, flow rates, and pressures in the DFS and pollution abatement system (PAS)2varied greatly. At 10:02 pm (2202 hours) the Kurz exhaust gas flow meter in the DFS PASfailed, causing a loss of system purge and an automatic shut-down (lock-out) of burners in boththe DFS kiln and the DFS afterburner (AFB). High airflow rates through the PAS resulted inscrubber fluid being drawn through the air flow meter into the demister. This transfer of fluidthrough the meter is the probable cause of its failure. During initial attempts to re-light theseburners, at 11:26 pm (23:26 hours), the Automatic Continuous Air Monitoring System (ACAMS) station PAS 701C3 (common stack) went into alarm at 0.67 allowable stackconcentration (ASC)4. At 11:28 pm (23:28 hours) ACAMS station PAS 701A (common stack)went into alarm at 1.57 ASC, and at 11:41 pm (23:41 hours) ACAMS station PAS 702 (DFS1The primary components of the DFS are a rotary kiln, a cyclone, and an afterburner connected to a pollutionabatement system (PAS). The function of the DFS is to incinerate drained rockets, landmines, and energeticsremoved from projectiles. These objects are incinerated in the kiln with the products of combustion flowing to theafterburner where the gases are thermally treated. Afterburner exhaust gases then flow to the DFS PAS where theyare further processed. The metal parts and other noncombustibles that discharge from the kin are further thermallytreated in the heated discharge conveyor .2Each of four furnaces systems at TOCDF has a PAS to cool and chemically treat the exhaust gases before they arereleased to the atmosphere. Each PAS consists of a quench tower, a venturi scrubber, packed bed scrubber tower,demister, exhaust blower, emergency exhaust blower, various recirculation and transfer pumps, and associatedpiping and instrumentation. All four PASs discharge exhaust gases to one common stack.3Agent monitoring on the common stack consist of "near-real-time"monitoring by three ACAMS stations (PAS701A, PAS 701B and PAS 701C) and confirmational monitoring by a DAAMS station associated with each of thethree ACAMS stations. Two of the ACAMS stations, with their associated DAAMS stations, are monitoring thecommon stack at all times. The analytical cycles of the two ACAMS are staggered to ensure continuous sampling ofthe common stack. When possible these two ACAMS will have dissimilar chromatographic columns to provide dualcolumn confirmation of analyte response. The ducts from the PAS of the four incinerators are each monitored by aACAMS and DAAMS. Station PAS 702 is on the DFS PAS duct.4The ASC is a ceiling value that serves as a source emission limit, and not as a health standard. It is used formonitoring the furnace ducts and common stack. The ASC provides an early indication of an upset condition.Modeling of worst-case credible event and conditions at each installation must confirm that the general populationlimit (GPL) monitoring level is not exceeded at the installation boundary as a consequence of releases at the ASC.The ASC value for GB is 0.0003 mg/m3. The terminology 0.67 ASC means 0.67 times the numerical value of theASC (0.0003 mg/m3).7

duct) went into alarm at 1.45 ASC. During a second attempt to re-light these burners, at 12:28am (00:28 hours, May 9, 2000) ACAMS station PAS 702 went into alarm at 0.87 ASC. At 12:29am (00:29 hours) ACAMS station PAS 701B went into alarm at 0.39 ASC; and at 12:30 am(00:30 hours) ACAMS station PAS 701C went into alarm at 0.56 ASC.A DFS control room operator (CRO) was on duty at the time of the incident. Although he hadcompleted all required training and was fully certified to be a DFS control room operator, he wasrelatively inexperienced in operating the DFS under non-normal maintenance conditions.However, this control room operator was being assisted by a second control room operator whohad more experience in operating the DFS in non-normal conditions. Believing that the kiln wasfree of hazardous material, the Supervisor Control Room Operator (SCRO) decided that this wasan opportune time for on-the-job-training and allowed the relatively inexperienced control roomoperator to continue to work to bring the DFS back to normal operating conditions. At 11:26 pm(23:26 hours) when PAS 701C alarmed at 0.67 ASC the control room supervisors responded tothe alarm, but because they believed the DFS was free of agent, they allowed the DFS recoveryefforts to continue. When PAS 701A alarmed 2 minutes later, the control room staff still did notbelieve that the DFS could be the source of agent because the DFS duct ACAMS (PAS 702) wasnot in alarm. Their goal continued to be to purge the DFS system and re-light at least one of theAFB burners to maintain the AFB temperature above 1000 degrees. However, after PAS 702went into alarm at 11:41 pm (23:41 hours) the SCRO directed the DFS CRO to bottle-up (orisolate) the DFS/DFS PAS at 11:44 pm (23:44 hours).Although the Depot Area Air Monitoring System (DAAMS) tubes confirmation analyses had notbeen completed by the laboratory, the SCRO directed the DFS CRO to purge the DFS and re light the AFB at 12:23 am (00:23 hours, May 9). The control room staff apparently continued tobelieve that no agent was present in the DFS. However, when at 12:28 am (00:28 hours), thePAS 702 went into alarm, followed be PAS 701B at 12:29 am (00:29 hours) and PAS 701C at12:30 am (00:30 hours), the SCRO directed the DFS CRO to again bottle-up the DFS PAS at12:32 am (00:32 hours).In summary, because of inadequate DFS temperatures, loss of kiln and AFB flame, anddecreased residence times through the DFS and PAS due to abnormally high airflow rates, asmall amount of GB agent escaped destruction and was released through the common stack.This release occurred during a non-normal maintenance procedure under incinerator conditions,which do not reflect normal operations.Agent Air Monitoring Systems (TOCDF)Agent Monitoring Time Line:The following time-line delineates the ACAMS alarms that occurred during the release of GB.May 8, 2000 11:26 pm (23:26)11:28 pm (23:28)11:40 pm (23:40)11:41 pm (23:41)PAS 701C alarms at 0.63 ASCPAS 701A alarms at 1.57 ASCPAS 701A peaks at 3.39 ASCPAS 701C peaks at 3.63 ASC8

(Agent Monitoring Time-Line, continued)11:41 pm (23:41)PAS 702 alarms/peaks at 1.45 ASC11:51 pm (23:51)PAS 701A clears alarm11:53 pm (23:53)PAS 701C clears alarmMay 9, 2000 12:08 am (00:08)PAS 702 clears alarm12:28 am (00:28)PAS 701B alarms at 0.39 ASC12:29 am (00:29)PAS 702 alarms at 0.87 ASC12:29 am (00:29)PAS 701C alarms at 0.56 ASC12:31 am (00:31)PAS 701B peaks at 0.74 ASC12:32 am (00:32)PAS 701C peaks at 0.81 ASC12:32 am (00:32)PAS 702 peaks at 1.07 ASC12:38 am (00:38)PAS 701C clears alarm12:40 am (00:40)PAS 701B clears alarm12:56 am (00:56)PAS 702 clears alarmAutomatic Continuous Air Monitoring System (ACAMS) Overview:ACAMS stations on the common stack (PAS 701-A, B, and C) functioned as designed indetecting the presence of chemical agent GB in the stack exhaust and alerting the workers (seeFigure 1). ACAMS station on the DFS duct (PAS 702) also detected GB, but at a lower levelthan expected based on the concentrations seen by common stack ACAMS (see discussion inQuality Control). Careful review of data from ACAMS monitoring the ECR, the ExplosiveContainment Vestibule (ECV), and other areas involved in the incident show results consistentwith known plant munitions and maintenance operations. During the incident, monitoringpersonnel within the plant responded timely and appropriately.Review of the strip charts containing the ACAMS chromatograms from PAS 701 A, B, and Cand PAS 702 showed that the chromatography (i.e., responses observed during the incident) wereidentical to the responses seen during quality control challenging with known GB agent. Thechromatographic peaks were well defined and centered in the retention time window for GB. AllMonitoring Branch personnel interviewed during this investigation were fully confident that thePAS 701 and PAS 702 ACAMS detected GB. Careful review of these same strip charts alsoshowed the occurrence of background peaks, possibly caused by various products of incompletecombustion, whose appearance coincided with documented upset conditions in the DFS and/orthe DFS PAS.A review of ACAMS monitoring data for ECR B shows a relationship between AFB and the GBconcentration in the ECR B. That is, as the AFB pressure became more negative, drawingadditional GB-contaminated air from ECR B into the DFS kiln, a rapidly decreasedconcentration in the ECR B was observed. These data support the assumption that thecontaminated ECR contributed as a source of agent involved in the release. Additionally, adramatic increase in the ECR GB concentrations from non-detected to approximately 80 timesthe time-weighted average (TWA)5 value coincided with the reported time of the DPE entry intothis room. All this air monitoring information supports the reported timeline of events.5The TWA is the airborne concentration to which unprotected workers may be repeatedly exposed for 8 hours perday, 5 days per week, for a working lifetime without adverse health effects. This monitoring level is operationallytreated as a ceiling value for the purpose of masking workers at demilitarization facilities. In3 1988, CDCrecommended a worker control limit for GB at 0.0001 milligrams per cubic meter air (mg/m ) averaged over 8hours. In the demilitarization program, this numeric control limit has been called a TWA. In this instance, 80 times9

During the investigation, TOCDF staff indicated they had experienced excessive numbers offalse positives during the period before the incident. A review of the TOCDF ACAMS commonstack alarm report for April and May 2000 showed 37 alarms among the three stack ACAMS(PAS 701 A, B, C). Of these 37 alarms, four were involved in the incident, 22 were alarmsassociated with waste-feed cut-off tests within the plant, and 10 alarms occurred because of aninterference (none were confirmed with DAAMS tubes). The remaining alarm was a nonconfirmed unknown source. All 10 alarms associated with the interference involved only asingle ACAMS and exhibited an abnormal chromatographic peak. In the case of the incident,both ACAMS monitoring the common stack went into alarm and exhibited a well-formedchromatographic peak in the retention time window for GB. Because the two involved ACAMShave different types of columns, the simultaneous alarms were essentially a confirmation ofpresence of GB. Therefore, control room personnel should not have discounted this information.During April and May, the only times when two ACAMS simultaneously alarmed (other thanactual incident) was during the performance of waste-feed cut-off tests. All other false-positivealarms during this time frame involved only one of the two ACAMS monitoring the stack.The problem with false-positive alarms related to waste-feed cut-off tests reportedly are relatedprimarily to liquid incinerator #2. Initial indications suggest possible fuel-rich conditions duringthe test may yield products incomplete combustion. The source of this problem is underinvestigation by TOCDF monitoring personnel. Solving this problem would substantially reducethe number of false-positive alarms.Depot Area Air Monitoring Systems (DAAMS) Confirmation Overview:DAAMS analyses confirmed the presence of GB in the common stack and the DFS duct.Qualitatively, all available DAAMS flame photometric detector (FPD) and mass spectral (MS)data are consistent with the identification of GB. Quantitatively, DAAMS results are consistentwith ACAMS concentrations detected in the common stack. Laboratory personnel followedestablished laboratory operating procedures, and all laboratory analytical instrumentation wereoperating well within established quality control limits.Quality Control (QC):ACAMS:A careful review of the biweekly quality control data, which covered the period before, during,and after the event, indicated that ACAMS involved were operating within established qualitycontrol parameters. A review of the “ACAMS Weekly/Daily Operational Log” for each of theACAMS at stations PAS 701 A, B, and C showed that all three instruments demonstratedconsistent recoveries of quality control challenges of 90% or greater during the 24-hour periodcentered around the time of the incident. In accordance with established quality controlprocedure, these ACAMS are challenged every 4 hours with a known quantity of GB agent.Also, during this timeframe, the PAS 702 ACAMS demonstrated recoveries of 90%-105%. Thisthe TWA means 80 times the numerical value of the TWA, not the actual average over 8 hours, because the value istreated as a ceiling value. It may be described elsewhere in the document in the format such as “80 TWA.”10

ACAMS is challenged every 24 hours according to established quality control procedures. Thecriterion for acceptable quality control challenges is 100% /- 25%.A review of the data in the Instrument Log Books for the sample dilution-control units on thethree PAS 701 ACAMS and the DFS duct (PAS 702) ACAMS showed that all of these unitshave been operating well within the /- 25% criterion since the April 1, 2000.A review of ACAMS data generated during the event showed an inconsistency between theresults obtained from the ACAMS on the common stack (701 A, B, and C) and the ACAMS onthe DFS duct (PAS 702). Because the DFS duct feeds directly into the common stack, apredictable correlation between PAS 702 and PAS 701 would be expected. Because of dilutioneffects in the common stack from other incinerators, the concentrations at PAS 702 would beexpected to be greater than those observed at PAS 701. Also, because PAS 702 is upstream fromPAS 701, one would expect PAS 702 to go into alarm before, or at least concurrently with, PAS701. However, in this incident the opposite was observed in both cases.Recognizing that routine quality control challenges only evaluate agent transfer efficienciesthrough heated transfer tubes that extend 50 to 70% of the probe length, CDC representativesrequested that the PAS 701 and 702 ACAMS probes be removed and challenged from the distalend. Results showed low and inconsistent transfer efficiency for PAS 702. The initial probechallenges from the distal tip were 24% and 57%. After washing the sample tube with deionizedwater, no (0%) transfer efficiency was noted. Flushing the PAS 702 probe again with deionizedwater, followed by air-drying, resolved the transfer efficiency problem (efficiency improved to118%). The “when, where, and what” characteristics of the contaminant(s) causing the apparentlow agent transfer efficiency are unknown. However, a plausible cause presented by TOCDFmonitoring personnel is the development of water condensation in the probe, which impairsagent transfer. ACAMS chromatographic data observed on PAS 702 during the event could beconsistent with possible absorption and desorption of agent in the PAS 702 sample probe. Datafrom distal-end evaluations of the PAS 701 A, B, and C probes demonstrated acceptable agenttransfer efficiencies (75%-105%). Because of the apparent problem with the PAS 702 sampleprobe, the quantitative data from PAS 701 A, B, and C were used to conduct the risk assessment.Follow-up evaluations of agent transfer from the end of the probe on May 17, 2000, showed 90%of higher transfer for common stack PAS 701 A, B, and C and metal parts furnace PAS 703.However, the distal end agent transfer check for Liquid Incinerator PAS 704 failed with a 55%transfer. Following rinsing with deionized water, the transfer efficiency increased to 80%.DAAMS:The DAAMS tubes are used to conduct more refined chromatography to confirm whether anACAMS alarm is actually GB agent or an interference. A review of quality control data from thestations DAAMS PAS 701 A, B, and C and DAAMS PAS 702 stations (quality plant [QP])6, and6A QP is a quality control sample that has been spiked with a known volume and concentration of dilute chemicalagent and exposed to the plant atmosphere or sample matrix.11

the quality control data from the laboratory instrumentation (quality laboratory – QL)7, indicatedthat these systems were functional and operating properly. That is, these quality controlparameters indicated that the DAAMS data generated during the release were valid. QL sampleswere run before and after the actual field samples related to the release to ensure that the gaschromatographs/mass spectrometer (GC/MS) and GC/FPD were operating properly and were incontrol. The recoveries of the QL samples analyzed in conjunction with the first and secondstack alarms were 82% and 74%, respectively, which are within the established criterion of100% /-35%. The retention times for GB in the field samples were consistent with the agent GBin standards and quality control samples. The ion ratios observed in the MS analyses of thesesame field samples were well within the established range.Personnel Qualification and Performance:Interviews, observations of work, and available documentation, indicated that the monitoring andanalytical staff appeared to be well qualified and proficient at their jobs.Perimeter Network Air Monitoring SystemEleven perimeter-monitoring stations are located at various points around the perimeter ofDeseret Chemical Depot (Figure 2). The perimeter stations use DAAMS tubes to collect airsamples over 12-hour sampling periods at a flow rate of approximately 0.5 liters per minute. Thesampling is accomplished with two tubes that are aspirated simultaneously at each station. Aftersampling, the DAAMS tubes are analyzed at the Chemical Agent Munitions DemilitarizationSystem (CAMDS), which is located near TOCDF. Perimeter DAAMS tubes sample

varied greatly. At 10:02 pm (2202 hours) the Kurz exhaust gas flow meter in the DFS PAS failed, causing a loss of system purge and an automatic shut-down (lock-out) of burners in both the DFS kiln and the DFS afterburner (AFB). High airflow rates through the PAS resulted in scrubber fluid being drawn throu